Gareth Evans

No first use is back on the global nuclear weapons campaign agenda, supported internationally by organizations like Global Zero and Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. The issue has also been given new life in the United States by the election of an evidently sympathetic President Joe Biden and the reintroduction into Congress by Senator Elizabeth Warren and Representative Adam Smith of their No First Use Act. Although the case for no first use has been well made before, it is timely, to revisit the arguments that make it such a compelling policy choice.

A nuclear-armed state is said to have a no-first-use policy when it makes an explicit declaration that it will not use nuclear weapons either preventively or preemptively against any adversary (nuclear-armed or not) and keeps them available only for use or threat of use by way of retaliation following a nuclear strike against itself or its allies. A less robust, but still meaningful, formulation of essentially the same idea is a declaration that “the sole purpose of the possession of nuclear weapons is to deter the use of such weapons against one’s own state and that of one’s allies.” This was the formula President Obama was prepared to embrace in 2010 until, unhappily, he was dissuaded by some of his NATO and Asia Pacific allies — and it is the position that President Biden still seems to support.

There is a long way to go in getting universal buy-in to either formulation, given the present nuclear postures of all nine current nuclear-armed states. Only China and India currently claim to be committed to no first use. The United States, in its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, stated that it does not maintain a no-first-use policy on the grounds that U.S. response options must remain flexible to deter both nuclear and non-nuclear attacks; Russia formally abandoned an earlier pledge in the 1990s; France has long maintained a first-use posture; the United Kingdom, Pakistan and North Korea have not ruled it out; and Israel, as ever, continues to refuse to confirm that it even has nuclear weapons.

There will always be those in the peace movement for whom any talk of no first use of nuclear weapons is unconscionable. It is not no first use they want, but no use at all, under any circumstances. Those who take this position argue that campaign energy and resources should be totally directed to getting the Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty, which is already supported by the great majority of states, universally embraced. They reject halfway measures which contemplate the possibility of something happening that must remain forever unthinkable.

In principle, this is a compelling argument. Nuclear weapons are not only the most indiscriminately inhumane ever devised, but any use of them is an existential risk to life on this planet as we know it. No one should waver for an instant in settling, as an endpoint, for anything less than global zero — the total elimination of nuclear weapons from the face of this planet.

But honesty demands acknowledgement that, right now, that end point is as far away as it has ever been. The Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty has huge moral and emotional appeal and remains very important in building and reinforcing the normative case against the legitimacy of nuclear weapons. It has, however, no buy-in whatsoever from any of the nuclear-armed states or those that think they benefit from their protection. Nor will it have buy-in for the foreseeable future, for reasons which are not just ideological, geopolitical and psychological, but go to verification and, above all, enforcement.

As unpalatable as this will be to some, and as overcautious as it will be to others, the only way forward to a nuclear-weapon free world is incremental. The process needs to be broken into manageable steps, focusing in the first instance on serious nuclear risk reduction, decreasing the prominence of nuclear weapons in countries’ defense planning, and creating doubts in policymakers’ minds about not only the legitimacy but the utility of nuclear deterrence. If one wants real-world progress, one should never make the best the enemy of the good. That is, we should not take the view that settling for anything less than perfection is not necessary compromise but capitulation.

The priority now, as stated in the report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, which I co-chaired with former Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi in 2009, is to direct immediate advocacy energy not into elimination, but rather minimization. In such a risk reduction agenda, achieving universal buy-in by the nuclear-armed states to no first use would be one of the four highest priorities.

Those priorities can be summarized as the “four Ds.” The first, nuclear doctrine — no first use — is given practical credibility by the next three: de-alerting — taking nuclear weapons off launch-ready, high-alert status; reduced deployment — drastically downsizing the number of those actively deployed; and decreased stockpiles — reducing overall numbers to around 2,000, down from the more than 13,000 now in existence.

A world with very low numbers of nuclear weapons, with very few of them physically deployed, with practically none of them on high-alert launch status, and with every nuclear-armed state visibly committed to never being the first to use them, would still be very far from perfect. But a world that could achieve these objectives would be a very much safer one than we live in now.

The case for no first use rests on two main pillars: keeping the option of first use is dangerous, and it is unnecessary. One could also conceivably invoke a further argument that any first use would be potentially illegal under international humanitarian law. But the relevant considerations here — necessity, proportionality, and so on — are just as applicable to retaliatory use as they are to first use, and as such don’t advance the present argument.

Retaining a first-use option is dangerous, both for wider global peace and security and often for nuclear-armed states’ own interests, because a nuclear-armed state that keeps a first-strike option runs the risk of an adversary misreading its intentions and, fearing decapitation, launching a preemptive strike of its own, precipitating an otherwise wholly avoidable nuclear war.

Arguably, a clear U.S. no-first-use policy would also help alleviate at least some of the anxieties currently inhibiting progress on North Korean denuclearization. Kim Jong-un, for one, is acutely aware that it makes little sense to keep a first-use option, given that it would be suicidal in the face of a U.S. response.

A no-limits option is unnecessary in the case of the major nuclear powers, especially the United States, because they have immense conventional firepower, amply sufficient to deter or respond to chemical, biological or other non-nuclear attacks. In the case of U.S. allies, U.S. conventional capability will be amply sufficient, when combined with their own capabilities, to protect them against any non-nuclear threat contingency for the foreseeable future.

The last-ditch argument usually made against no-first-use declarations is that they are simply not believable. The claim is that other states will behave as if they were never made, meaning that there will be no end to the dangers of ambiguity; and further that, in extremis, any state will simply do what it believes it has to do. But the first part of this critique understates the extent to which military leaders do, in practice, pay close attention to others’ declaratory policies. These signals of intent do shape the expectations of allies and adversaries alike, in what can either be a virtuous or vicious cycle.

The bottom-line case for adopting no-first-use policies or their sole-purpose functional equivalents is not that they will, by themselves, bring an end to the terrible existential risk to life on this planet that will continue as long as any nuclear weapons remain. It is that they are an extremely important contributor to immediate nuclear risk reduction, to the necessary ongoing progress of delegitimizing nuclear weapons in policymakers’ thinking and to maintaining a global commitment to non- proliferation.

Above all, no-first-use policies and their sole-purpose functional equivalents are an absolutely necessary waystation on the road to complete nuclear disarmament. There is a long way to go in achieving a safer and saner nuclear-weapons-free world, but getting the United States and the other reluctant nuclear-armed states to embrace no first use would be a great place to start.

Gareth Evans is Distinguished Professor at the Australian National University, former Foreign Minister of Australia and President Emeritus of the International Crisis Group. He initiated the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (1996), co-chaired the Australia-Japan International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (2009), and is Chair of the Seoul-based Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. His article is edited from Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 5, 2021, and was published in PeaceMeal, May/June 2021.

(In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, this material is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes.)

Dr. John Burroughs, Senior Analyst
Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, March 17, 2021

The picture for all nine nuclear-armed states is grim, but one nuclear-armed state — the United States — has long served as a pacesetter. The United States is planning to replace and upgrade essentially its entire nuclear arsenal — delivery systems and warheads. The delivery systems include: bombers, air-launched cruise missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarines, and Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

From the Trump years, a low-yield warhead already has been deployed on submarine-launched missiles. And a submarine- launched cruise-missile is in development, which would replace a capability discontinued during the Obama years. Hopefully, the Biden administration will withdraw the low-yield warheads and end development of the submarine-launched cruise missiles, but those decisions have yet to be made.

Over the next three decades, the replacement program will cost on the order of $2-trillion, including maintenance of existing and replaced forces. The U.S. currently spends more than $30-billion annually on its delivery systems and warheads, with another roughly $20-billion spent on environmental management, health costs, and military and intelligence functions related to its nuclear forces.

This program is contrary to United States obligations under Non-Proliferation Treaty, Article VI, which requires good faith negotiations on nuclear disarmament. 2020 was the 50^th anniversary of the NPT. Fifty years was certainly a sufficient period for fulfilment of this obligation if pursued in good faith. Yet the U.S. is planning for at least several more decades of reliance on nuclear arms; time horizons reach into the second half of this century. Moreover, Article VI requires negotiations on cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date. In certain respects, U.S. plans definitely qualify as nuclear arms racing, notably with respect to the planned air-launched cruise missile.

The legal obligation to disarm is not the only relevant legal element. The U.S. is bound, and recognizes it is bound, by the law of armed conflict, international humanitarian law. In short, nuclear arms cannot be used in compliance with that law, or with human rights law. That means the U.S. is relying for the indefinite future upon weapons that must not be used from a legal standpoint or any standpoint.

The U.S. already has air-launched cruise missiles, but the planned ALCM will be stealthier, more accurate, longer range, and, if the U.S. Air Force has its way, deployed in large numbers — in the hundreds, with 1,000 to be produced. And it would be deployed on a new stealth bomber, the B-21.

Because the new ALCM can penetrate air defenses, it is a war-fighting weapon, which can be seen as a first-strike capability. This system deserves more attention than it is getting. It is currently in development; production is planned for 2026. The acquisition cost is on the order of $11 billion.

The new Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), currently dubbed Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent, would cost more than $250 billion over its lifetime, including a $100 billion acquisition cost. It would contribute to the need for production of plutonium pits for its enhanced warhead, the W-87-1; more than 80 such pits per year are planned by 2030.

Land-based missiles present a fixed target; thus, they are highly vulnerable, inviting a Russian counter-force strike. If early warning signals indicate such an attack is underway, there is pressure to use or lose the missiles. ICBMs thus increase the chance of accidental nuclear war. They are also perceived as first-strike weapons. ICBMs are not necessary to preserve an option to respond in kind to a nuclear attack; submarine-launched ballistic missiles and bombers are sufficient for that.

ICBMs should therefore be eliminated, unilaterally or through negotiations. The existing ICBMs, the Minuteman III, also can be life-extended through the middle of the century if deemed necessary. Undertaking their replacement is a definitive signal that the U.S. has no intention of giving up nuclear weapons for many decades to come.

The replacement cost for ballistic-missile submarines, with 12 to be fielded, is estimated at $128 billion. Trident Submarine- Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) are undergoing life- extension. Its W76-1 warhead has been made much more accurate; it is now a counterforce weapon. A new warhead, the W-93, is planned for deployment by 2040, at an estimated cost of $15 billion.

I have already mentioned the low-yield warhead deployed on SLBMs by the Trump administration. The Biden administration should soon decide to withdraw those warheads from deployment. Deployment of an around five-kiloton warhead — about a third of the size of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs — on a submarine-launched missile is characterized as enabling a limited response to a limited Russian first use. However, any acquisition of a capability perceived as more usable amounts to a lowering of the nuclear war threshold. The U.S. already has low-yield capabilities, and use of the term “low-yield” to describe this weapon obscures the fact that explosion of the warhead would have extremely destructive effects. If used in an urban area, it could kill many tens of thousands of people, not including fallout effects.

Regarding the planned submarine-launched cruise missile, even if you are a supporter of so-called deterrence, it is simply a redundant capability, as the Obama administration recognized. The Biden administration and Congress should end its development in the next fiscal year, if not sooner.

Production and deployment of particular nuclear weapons systems need to be prevented, and negotiations on elimination of nuclear arms commenced. To succeed, we also have to work on maintaining peaceful relations among major powers in accordance with basic requirements of the U.N. Charter, and on limiting non-nuclear as well as nuclear forces, as called for by Article 26 of the Charter.

Dr. Burroughs’ speech has been edited and was published in PeaceMeal, May/June 2021.

(In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, this material is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes.)

Elisabeth Eave
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 8, 2021

America is building a new weapon of mass destruction, a nuclear missile the length of a bowling lane. It will be able to travel some 6,000 miles, carrying a warhead about 20 times more powerful than the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. It will be able to kill hundreds of thousands of people in a single shot. The U.S. Air Force plans to order more than 600 of them.

On September 8, the Air Force gave the defense company Northrop Grumman an initial contract of $13.3 billion to begin engineering and manufacturing the missile, but that will be just a fraction of the total bill. Based on a Pentagon report cited by the Arms Control Association, the government will spend roughly $100 billion to build the weapon, which will be ready to use around 2029.

To put that price tag in perspective, $100 billion could pay 1.24-million elementary school teacher salaries for a year, provide 2.84-million four-year university scholarships, or cover 3.3-million hospital stays for COVID-19 patients. It’s enough to get to Mars.

For now, the missile goes by the inglorious acronym GBSD, for “ground-based strategic deterrent.” The GBSD is designed to replace the existing fleet of Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Like its predecessors, the GBSD fleet will be lodged in underground silos, widely scattered in three groups known as “wings” across five states. The official purpose of American ICBMs goes beyond responding to nuclear assault. They are also intended to deter such attacks, and serve as targets in case there is one.

Under the theory of deterrence, America’s nuclear arsenal — currently made up of 3,800 warheads — sends a message to other nuclear-armed countries. It relays to the enemy that U.S. retaliation would be so awful, it had better not attack in the first place. Many consider American deterrence a success, pointing to the fact that no country has ever attacked the United States with nuclear weapons. But this is faulty logic. The absence of a nuclear attack on the United States doesn’t prove that 3,800 warheads are essential to deterrence. And for practical purposes, after the first few hundred, they quickly grow redundant.

Deterrence is the main argument for having a nuclear arsenal at all. But America’s land-based missiles have another strategic purpose all their own. Housed in permanent silos spread across America’s high plains, they are intended to draw fire to the region in the event of a nuclear war, forcing Russia to use up a lot of its arsenal on a sparsely populated area. If that happened and all three wings were destroyed, the attack would kill more than 10-million people and turn the area into a charred wasteland, unfarmable and uninhabitable for centuries to come.

The GBSD’s detractors include long-time peace activists, as well as many former military leaders, and their criticism has to do with those immovable silos. Relative to nuclear missiles on submarines, which can slink around undetected, and nuclear bombs on airplanes, America’s land-based nuclear missiles are easy marks.

Because they are so exposed, they pose another risk: To avoid being destroyed and rendered useless, they would be “launched on warning,” that is, as soon as the Pentagon got wind of an incoming nuclear attack. But the computer systems that warn of such incoming fire may be vulnerable to hacking and false alarms.

During the Cold War, military computer glitches in both the United States and Russia caused a number of close calls, and since then, cyberthreats have become an increasing concern. An investigation ordered by the Obama administration in 2010 found that the Minutemen missiles were vulnerable to a potentially crippling cyberattack. Because an error could have disastrous consequences, James Mattis, the former Marine Corps general who would go on to become the 26^th U.S. secretary of defense, testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2015 that getting rid of America’s land-based nuclear missiles “would reduce the false alarm danger.” Whereas a bomber can be turned around even on approach to its target, a nuclear missile launched by mistake can’t be recalled.

Residents of Hawaii received notifications like this on January 13, 2018, a false alarm that went uncorrected for thirty-eight minutes.

Given the expense, doubtful strategic purpose, and lack of popularity, why is Washington spending so much to replace the Minuteman III? The answers stretch from the Utah desert to Montana wheat fields to the halls of Congress. They span presidential administrations and political parties. They come from airmen and farmers and senators and CEOs.

The reasons for the GBSD are historical, political and, to a significant extent, economic. Many people in the states where the new missile will be built and based see the jobs as a lifeline. Their elected officials take campaign donations from defense companies, to be sure, but are also trying to deliver jobs in a political environment that has been hostile to government spending on anything but defense. Defense is the safety net where other options are few.

A lot of people, even some of those whose livelihoods depend on them, would like to see the number of nuclear weapons gradually reduced until they’re gone. The United States stands no chance of making them disappear, though, until more people understand why they exist — and how little some nuclear weapons programs have to do with national defense.

– PeaceMeal, March/April 2021

(In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, this material is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes.)

Steven Aftergood

The use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) electronic parts in nuclear weapons systems may reduce the reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal over time as the electronics age in ways that are hard to predict, according to a newly disclosed report from the JASON science advisory panel.

“Most of the electronic materials and components within a weapon system are electrically inactive for a majority of the system lifetime” — which in a nuclear weapon can last for decades. “Determining the reliability of successfully executing a highly demanding, short-duration, operational sequence for systems that have been dormant over extended time periods challenges our ability to model, predict, and meet system performance requirements,” the JASON report to the National Nuclear Security Administration said. “A goal of reliable performance after 40-60 years of unmonitored storage poses difficult, and perhaps unrealistic, challenges for electronic components to electrical subsystems and systems, whether or not COTS materials are utilized.”

The JASON panel offered 15 recommendations for identifying and detecting electronic failure modes and validating electronic reliability under the long-term conditions of the U.S. nuclear stockpile.

The characteristic failure modes of electronics that are dormant for decades differ from those that are in regular use. But the concern for reliability is not unique to nuclear weapons. “The aeronautics, aerospace, automotive, and medical device industries face similar design and assembly challenges — to ensure reliable performance and extremely low failure rates in electronics built with commercial components, often for high-consequence applications,” the report noted.

Accordingly, the JASONs said, NNSA should partner with the Department of Defense, NASA and others to share relevant knowledge and to undertake a “forward-looking program of focused materials research and development. . . . This will remain important as long as consumer electronics continue to change rapidly; there is no one-and-done solution that will solve the challenges associated with materials aging and reliability of COTS electronic systems with long dormancy.”

In the meantime, NNSA should also pursue “component and subsystem designs that enable regular monitoring through subsystem testing done in the field, in order to ensure reliable functioning of the electronics components.”

The systematic adoption of COTS electronics within military programs was driven in part by a 1994 memo from then-Defense Secretary William Perry, “Specifications & Standards — A New Way of Doing Business,” which encouraged DoD to increase reliance on commercial technology.

In the past, electronic components were specifically designed and fabricated for each weapon system, the JASONs noted. “Traditionally, in weapons systems, custom parts were used and strong control was exerted over the part manufacturers; reliability still had to be assessed.” But today, “The military remains only a small fraction of the electronics market and so cannot alone be expected to drive new products, enforce quality, or improve reliability.”

As a result, “NNSA should view with skepticism expectations of long-term stability and reliability when adopting COTS electronic components whose design and manufacture were predicated on applications in commercial products with limited service lifetimes,” the JASONs said.

The JASON report was released by NNSA on March 9 under the Freedom of Information Act with redactions of certain deliberative information “regarding the future of the Nuclear Weapons Program.

– Federation of American Scientists, March 11, 2021
PeaceMeal, March/April 2021

(In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, this material is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes.)