Non-Proliferation Treaty-1

NPT Conference shows growing rift between nuclear weapon haves and have-nots

An increasingly acrimonious standoff between the world’s major nuclear-weapons powers and dozens of non-weapons states played out at the month-long conference for review of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at the United Nations that concluded on May 22. The parties to the treaty failed to approve a final document due to opposition from nuclear powers on steps toward nuclear disarmament and on building a Middle East nuclear-weapons-free zone.

This state of affairs echoed the 2005 NPT Review Confer-ence, which also ended in failure because of open conflict between the non-nuclear weapons states pushing for disarm-ament and the nuclear weapons states resisting those efforts.

Under an action plan adopted at the NPT Review Conference in 2010, the “Big Five” nuclear-weapon states — the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China — committed to “accelerate concrete progress” toward arms reductions but, as usual, rejected any specific timelines for abolishing nuclear weapons.

The 2010 final document also had called for convening a conference in 2012 “on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.” However, Israel, in defense of its undeclared nuclear arsenal, refused to participate and the conference never took place. Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea are the only countries that are not signatories to the NPT.

The “grand bargain” reached in the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty was that all states would have access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and those without the bomb would not try to get it, while those possessing it would reduce their arsenals to global zero. However, the nuclear weapons states continue to reject their 45-year-old obligation under the NPT to disarm. They have stalled disarmament and instead are modernizing or even expanding their arsenals. That is especially true of the United States and Russia, who still have some 9,000 warheads in their combined military stockpiles — 90 percent of the world total.

To their credit, the U.S. and Russia have reduced their nuclear arsenals in accordance with the New START Treaty of 2010. But despite the lofty rhetoric of his 2009 speech in Prague, advocating the goal of a “world without nuclear weapons”, President Barack Obama’s parallel actions have worked against that goal. He is pursuing a plan to spend hundreds of billions of dollars over the next decades to upgrade the U.S. arsenal. Russian President Vladimir Putin, on his part, has ignored President Obama’s calls for a new round of disarmament talks and hardened the role of nuclear weapons in his national security doctrine.

The stalled disarmament actions, coupled with mounting proliferation pressures in volatile regions like East Asia and the Middle East, are prompting some nonproliferation experts to warn that the world could be on the threshold of a dangerous expansion of nuclear weaponry — and that the risk of “unthinkable” nuclear war is growing.

– edited from The Christian Science Monitor, May 21, 2015, and The Associated Press
PeaceMeal, May/June 2015

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Fractures are widening on Non-Proliferation Treaty

When delegates from the 155 signatories of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) convene in Vienna in April, they will have little to point to since its entry into force in 1970 in the way of progress toward the treaty’s promise of worldwide nuclear disarmament. In the five years since the last NPT review conference, no nation possessing nuclear weapons has given them up. Most, if not all, are updating their arsenals, making it plain that they intend nuclear weapons to remain a key part of their strategic plans for the future.

“The state of nuke disarmament is not good. The NPT is in serious trouble from a number of sides,” says Alexander Kmentt, director for disarmament, arms control and nonproliferation in Austria’s foreign ministry. The intransigence of the nuclear weapons states on curtailing their arsenals threatens the continued existence of the treaty, he warns.

Progress is “so painfully slow that it too often feels as if we are moving backwards,” complained Desmond Browne, former U.K. minister of defense, at the annual conference of the Arms Control Association (ACA) on 20 October. “It’s difficult to see a path forward when the nuclear weapons states can’t agree on how to proceed and the nonnuclear weapons states are angry about the pace of progress towards disarmament.”

Article 6 of the NPT obligates the declared weapons states — the U.S., U.K., France, China and Russia, known as the P5 nations — to proceed quickly toward disarmament, although it sets no timetable. With the continued obdurateness of P5 members, the quid pro quo that NPT’s 150 non-nuclear-weapons nations gave in agreeing not to seek nuclear weapons capabilities of their own has grown increasingly fragile.

In addition, the fact that India, Pakistan, and Israel remain outside the NPT continues to undermine it. North Korea was a member but has renounced the treaty and conducted several underground nuclear tests. And the nuclear program of Iran, which is an NPT member, may be in violation of the treaty.

A major agenda item for April’s NPT review conference is the implementation of a 64-point action plan issued at the conclusion of the last review conference in 2010. The document includes 22 specific steps to be taken toward disarmament. The remaining action items deal with nonproliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear power.

By most measures, however, little has been accomplished for most of those steps. According to a report card issued in February 2014 by the disarmament advocacy group Reaching Critical Will, no concrete progress has been made on 11 of the 22 items, limited progress has been made on 6, and substantial progress has been made on just 5. Particularly disappointing, the report said, is that the P5 nations will not meet their commitments to work toward global stockpile reductions by diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies, lowering the operational readiness status of weapons, reducing the risk of accidental use, and increasing transparency and mutual confidence.

Four of the items in the plan, including the development of a verification regime, concern the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which has not yet entered into force. Although President Obama in 2009 pledged to “immediately and aggressively pursue” CTBT ratification, U.S. officials have declined to say when Obama might bring the treaty before the Senate, which rejected it in 1999. When the New START treaty on arms reduction with Russia was brought before the Senate in 2010, the administration had to promise to increase spending on nuclear weapons in order to get the votes needed. It’s unlikely that there now are the 67 votes required for CTBT ratification.

Although the Obama administration’s rhetoric on arms reductions has been positive, its progress has been minimal. According to a recent analysis by Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists, Obama has reduced warhead numbers by 500, or 10 percent, through his six years in office. His predecessor, President George W. Bush, eliminated more than 5,000, a 50 percent reduction.

Obama in 2013 offered to negotiate with Russia a one-third cut in each side’s nuclear stockpile below New START levels. But the administration will face congressional resistance to further reductions, especially with the chill in Washington–Moscow relations since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Russia has scant interest in making further reductions to its nuclear stockpile and has been unwilling to even commit to negotiations. It is more concerned with the U.S. development of ballistic missile defense and long-range precision conventional strike capability, and it insists that those concerns be resolved in advance of talks on further nuclear weapons reductions.

Frustrated by the lack of progress, the nonweapons states last year began holding conferences outside the NPT framework focused on humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons. The conferences have concluded that the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons are much worse than previously thought. During October’s U.N. General Assembly, 154 nations joined New Zealand in urging greater consideration of the humanitarian impacts. “Past experience from the use and testing of nuclear weapons has amply demonstrated the unacceptable humanitarian consequences caused by the immense, uncontrollable destructive capability and indiscriminate nature of these weapons,” stated Dell Higgie, New Zealand’s ambassador for disarmament.

Just as the nonweapons states want disarmament, the P5 nations have a strong interest in curbing nuclear proliferation. “It is a fallacy to think that it will be possible in the long run to con-tain the lid on nuclear prolifer-ation without getting serious on nuclear disarmament,” Kmentt says. “That is the flaw in the ap-proach that the nuclear weapons states have followed so far.”

– edited from an article by David Kramer in Physics Today, December 2014
PeaceMeal, Jan/February 2015

Nuke session approves early steps to disarm

UNITED NATIONS - The 189 member nations of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on May 28 adopted a detailed plan of small steps down a long road toward nuclear disarmament, including a sharply debated proposal to move toward banning doomsday weapons from the Middle East. The 28-page final declaration was approved by consensus on the last day of the month-long conference, which is convened every five years to review and advance the objectives of the 40-year-old NPT.

Under its action plan, the "Big Five" recognized nuclear-weapon states -- the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China -- commit to speed up arms reductions, take other steps to diminish the importance of nuclear weapons, and report back on progress by 2014. The final document also calls for convening a conference in 2012 "on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction."

"All eyes the world over are watching us," the conference president, Libran Cabactulan of the Philippines, said before gaveling the final document into the record. Adoption was met with hearty applause beneath the U.N. General Assembly hall's soaring dome. U.S. Undersecretary of State Ellen Tauscher told the assembled delegates, "The final document this conference adopted today advances President Obama's vision" of a world without nuclear weapons.

Under the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty, nations without nuclear weapons committed not to acquire them; those with them committed to move toward their elimination; and all endorsed everyone's right to develop peaceful nuclear energy.

The last NPT conference in 2005 ended in failure because of open conflict between the non-Nuclear Weapons States pushing for disarmament and the Nuclear Weapons States resisting those efforts. The bickering between the Bush administration in particular and countries demanding that the United States shrink its own arsenals ran so deep that no real negotiations over how to stem nuclear proliferation ever took place. Two weeks were spent just arguing about the agenda. President Barack Obama's support for an array of arms-control measures much improved the cooperative atmosphere at this year's conference.

For the first time at an NPT RevCon, the final declaration laid out complex action plans for all three of the treaty's "pillars" -- nonproliferation, disarmament and peaceful nuclear energy. The five recognized weapons states did manage to strip earlier drafts of specific timelines for disarmament negotiations, such as a proposal that they consult among themselves on how to disarm and report back to the 2015 conference, after which a high-level meeting would convene to negotiate a "roadmap" for abolishing nuclear weapons. But in the final draft, they committed to "accelerate concrete progress" toward reducing their nuclear weaponry, and to report on progress in 2014 in preparation for the 2015 NPT RevCon.

Cuba expressed the disappointment of many non-Nuclear Weapons States that the Nuclear Weapons States did not accept a firmer timetable, saying it had done "all we could to set a timetable with 2025 as the deadline for the total elimination of nuclear weapons." The disarmament action plan also leaves a major gap, since it doesn't obligate four of the Nuclear Weapons States that are not members of the treaty -- Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea.

The Arab idea of a Middle East WMD-free zone is designed to pressure Israel to give up its undeclared nuclear arsenal. Arab states and Israel's allies had been at odds over wording in the plan to convene a conference in 2012 to address that issue. Despite the decision to include it in the plan adopted, U.S. officials questioned whether Israel could be persuaded to attend such a conference. The Israelis objected to participating under terms in which they were the only nation singled out in this way but, in the end, the clause remained in the text adopted. Tauscher said that would "seriously jeopardize" U.S. efforts to persuade the Israelis to attend talks in 2012. Iran has long expressed support for a nuke-free Mideast, but Israel has long said a full Arab-Israeli peace must precede such weapons bans.

– edited from The Associated Press and The New York Times
PeaceMeal, May/June 2010

2009 NPT PrepCom a qualified success

The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in 1970, mandates a conference by signatories at five-year intervals to review progress toward the Treaty’s goal of nuclear disarmament. This year, the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference took place at the United Nations, May 4-15. Following is the front page article by Michael Spies and Ray Acheson of Reaching Critical Will (for Nuclear Disarmament) from the final edition of NPT News in Review, the daily NGO newsletter at the PrepCom. Reaching Critical Will is a project of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF).

By the abysmal standards that have typified the preparatory process leading up to each five-year review of the NPT, the third and final Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting before the 2010 Review Conference (RevCon) must certainly be considered a success. The PrepCom was able to agree to an agenda for the RevCon amid a chorus of accolades for what many described as a new, positive atmosphere in multilateral disarmament, stemming entirely from US President Obama’s April 7 speech in Prague.

However, it did not surprise many delegates — most of whom are veterans of the so-called “decade of deadlock” that had accompanied the Bush administration’s allergy to multilateralism — that the PrepCom would become snagged once it attempted to work through matters of substance. The PrepCom’s failure to adopt substantive recommendations for the RevCon, a feat no previous PrepCom had ever accomplished, may have temporarily tainted the atmosphere, but was not unforeseen.

During his opening remarks to the PrepCom, its Chair, Ambassador Chidyausiku of Zimbabwe, cautioned that despite recent signs of progress, in many areas the positions of states had actually grown further apart rather than closer. With this note of caution, on May 11, the Chair circulated a clever and concise first draft of recommendations, intended to capture specific proposals that identify concrete practical actions on implementing the Treaty, stand a reasonable chance of gaining consensus, and build upon earlier decisions. Its strongest provisions dealt with moving the disarmament agenda forward and even included consideration of a nuclear weapons [abolition] convention .

It must be noted that the vast majority of states could have accepted the first draft, including many members of NATO, with little or no modifications. Following consultations, and in particular input from the nuclear weapon states, on Wednesday, May 13, the Chair put forward a revised set of recommendations that significantly weakened the sections on disarmament, civil society participation, and education, but bolstered those on implementing the 1995 Middle East resolution on non-proliferation.

For some, the second draft proved to be a bridge too far. As the conference moved into its final hours, it devolved into a tense blame game that pitted western delegations against the Non-Aligned Movement and some of its more outspoken members, most notably Cuba, Egypt, and Iran. On Thursday, May 14, the Chair advised states to let the recommendations go, so as to not to ruin the spirit of cooperation. Despite the Chair’s judgment that the differences in position were too vast, a large number of delegations urged the Chair to continue the process of seeking consensus.

Despite the positive atmosphere, disarmament rhetoric of the U.S. and U.K. administrations, and the quick adoption of the agenda, the PrepCom delegates did not find enough common ground — or at least, enough common rhetoric — to agree to a set of non-binding recommendations for next year. Breaking with the recent past, the Chair decided not to forward the recommendations to the RevCon as a working paper.

The Chair introduced a newly revised draft of recommendations on Friday, May 15. Delegations consulted with their regional groups before resuming an informal meeting of the PrepCom. During this last attempt to reach consensus on the draft recommendations, the Chair determined that the Committee did not have a sufficient amount of time to reach agreement. Later, at a press briefing, he said the “differences were very minor; with time, we could have done it.”

The differences, as laid out by delegations during Thursday’s plenary discussion on the draft recommendations, did not seem very minor, though the revisions in the third draft were quite minimal. ... Despite the lack of time to make additional major changes to the text (delegations would have needed to consult with their capitals had the second draft text been heavily amended), western and non-aligned delegations traded blame for the impasse. Since the first draft was not agreeable to a few western states and the second was not agreeable to a few non-aligned states, it would be cynical and insincere to place“blame” on any particular group or delegation. Instead, the experience only serves to further illuminate the wide gulfs between states’ positions. ...

While the vast majority of states parties seemed ready to accept either the first or second drafts, no one was entirely content with either. Rather than becoming stuck with an imperfect text, delegations will have the freedom in 2010 to negotiate and reach agreement with a clean slate on the many issues facing the NPT regime.

– PeaceMeal, May/June 2009

2005 NPT Review Conference Bushwhacked

The month-long conference at the United Nations to review progress toward achieving the goals of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) ended May 27 in failure. The open conflict between the non-Nuclear Weapons States pushing for disarmament and the Nuclear Weapons States resisting those efforts resulted in a deadlock at the previous Review Conference in 2000. By the time of this year's conference, the situation had deteriorated to the point that two weeks were spent just arguing about the agenda.

The bickering between the Bush administration in particular, which wanted to focus exclusively on North Korea and Iran, and countries demanding that the United States shrink its own arsenals, ran so deep that no real negotiations over how to stem nuclear proliferation ever took place. Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, director of the International Atomic Energy Agency which monitors compliance with the treaty, said "absolutely nothing" had come out of the meeting. "We are ending after a month of rancor — when everyone agreed that the system is ailing but not busted," he said, "and the same issues continue to stare us in the eyes."

The 1970 NPT is the cornerstone of both non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament. The ambitious purpose of the treaty is the recreation of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Crucial to global security, the treaty rests on a bargain between those states without nuclear weapons, who agreed to renounce any ambition to acquire them, and the nuclear-weapon powers, who undertook in return to proceed in good faith to complete disarmament.

The acrimonious exchanges in the conference just concluded reflect the frustration of the vast majority of states, who believe they have kept their side of the deal by not developing nuclear weapons but have seen no sign that the privileged elite with nuclear weapons have any intention of giving them up.

The original intention of the NPT was affirmed in 1996 by a unanimous opinion of the International Court of Justice that the treaty legally binds the nuclear powers to actually achieve disarmament, not just conduct endless negotiations leading nowhere. But the Bush administration, in order to maintain the status quo of the United States' 10,000 warhead arsenal, ignored the disarmament goal and presented the purpose of the treaty as merely halting proliferation — preventing expansion of the elite club. Puffing up the North Korea and Iran issues was the administration's ploy to deflect attention from it's own violations of the NPT, such as pursuing development of smaller, "more useable" nuclear weapons.

At the 2000 Review Conference, the Big Five nuclear powers – the United States, Russia, France, Britain, and China – rejected any timetable for meeting the goal of nuclear disarmament, as well as a proposed requirement that they document their steps toward disarmament. They also rejected concerns that thousands of the world's 30,000 nuclear weapons remain on hair-trigger alert and refused a pledge of no-first-use of nuclear weapons in battle. Those dangerous policies could lead to an accidental nuclear war and remain unchanged.

The only nations that are not parties to the NPT are Israel, India and Pakistan, which have nuclear weapons, and North Korea, which claims to have an unsubstantiated nuclear weapon capability.

This year's conference had once been seen as a chance to deal with a gaping loophole in the treaty: how to deal with countries that are permitted to make nuclear material for civilian electrical generation, and then run secret weapons programs. IAEA director ElBaradei unsuccessfully proposed new mechanisms for international control of nuclear material so nations could not secretly produce weapons-grade fuel. And in the end, conference participants criticized (without naming them) both the United States for ignoring its commitments to disarmament, and other nations for failing to grapple with the Iranian and North Korean problems.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty has been the best barrier put up by the international community against the spread of nuclear weapons. With the support of all but a handful of nations, the treaty has provided a strong declaration that the development of nuclear weapons is taboo. That international pressure has since resulted in more countries abandoning nuclear weapons than acquiring them.

Previous NPT Review Conferences have been used as an important opportunity to regenerate support for the treaty. But not this time. The gulf was so wide that the conference chairman, Sergio Duarte of Brazil, mused aloud on the closing day whether the treaty was actually further weakened by the session. Due to the self-interests of the few, it was a tragically missed opportunity to strengthen international cooperation to reduce the global threats of nuclear terrorism and nuclear war.

– edited from The New York Times and The Guardian (U.K.)

For a report on the 2005 NPT Review Conference by Abolition 2000, see the right-hand sidebar at: www.nuclearpolicy.org

– PeaceMeal, May/June 2005

Can the Non-Proliferation Treaty be saved?

The 2005 Review Conference of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will meet May 2-27 at the United Nations at a time when the Treaty itself faces threats to its survival. With Korea having already announced withdrawal from the Treaty, the possibility that another nation may follow, and regressive changes in nuclear doctrine by some Nuclear Weapon States — predominantly the United States, it is clear that the Treaty is vulnerable and in need of strengthening. (see: www.npt2005.org)

The NPT is the cornerstone of both non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament. As interpreted by the World Court, the Treaty legally binds the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) to achieve nuclear disarmament. In return, the non-NWS agree to forego nuclear weapons.

In spite of the Treaty obligation to disarm, United States policy is to maintain an arsenal of some 10,000 nuclear warheads into the middle of this century. The Administration wants to build a new multi-billion-dollar facility to produce plutonium pits and has prepared to resume production of tritium for that very purpose.

In the Bush Administration's view, however, "the United States is in full compliance with its obligations." (Stephen G. Rademaker, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, February 3, 2005)

The NPT entered into force in 1970. It represents the only binding commitment by the NWS to the goal of nuclear disarmament. It has been ratified by 188 countries — all but Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea — more than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement. It has had some degree of success, as measured by the small number of NWS that exist and by the number of states that turned away from programs or actual possession of nuclear weapons. Yet after thirty-five years, the NPT still has no institutional support.

In three of the six NPT Review Conferences to date, consensus on a final document reporting the results of the conferences could not be reached. The last Review Conference in 2000 was a month of wrangling between the non-Nuclear Weapons States pushing for disarmament and the Nuclear Weapons States resisting those efforts. In overtime, the parties to the Treaty adopted a statement that provides a semantic smoke screen behind which the major nuclear powers can hide their refusal to get serious about nuclear disarmament. The Big Five nuclear powers — the United States, Russia, France, Britain, and China — agreed to an "unequivocal undertaking ... to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament."

The statement seems like an "everything-is-beautiful" pledge to disarm, but nothing could be further from the truth. The Big Five rejected any timetable for meeting the goal of nuclear disarmament, as well as a proposed requirement that they document their steps toward disarmament during the five years until the 2005 Review Conference. They also rejected concerns that thousands of the world's 35,000 nuclear weapons remain on hair-trigger alert and refused a pledge of no-first-use of nuclear weapons in war. The nuclear powers did agree to negotiate by 2005 a treaty banning the production of fissile material. However, opposition by the Bush Administration has thwarted any action toward that goal.

Observers are concerned that a similar stalemate might occur at this year's Review Conference. Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), sees a positive opportunity to strengthen global security without amending the treaty by taking seven straightforward steps. They include a five-year hold on additional facilities for uranium enrichment and plutonium separation, pursuing and prosecuting any illicit trading in nuclear material and technology, and accelerating implementation by the Nuclear Weapon States of their "unequivocal commitment" to nuclear disarmament. (see: www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2005/ebsp2005n001.html).

Thirty-two Nobel prizewinners and 237 nongovernmental organizations and parliamentarians from around the world issued a statement on April 5, 2005, urging that strategic nuclear weapons systems be taken off hair-trigger alert in order to lessen the risk of accidental nuclear war. Both the United States and Russia maintain thousands of warheads on "launch on warning" status, and a number of terrifying near- misses have taken place. The European Parliament has already endorsed the appeal.

The total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee for all peoples of the world against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We advocates of non-proliferation and nuclear weapons abolition need to maintain a concerted effort to prod our elected officials along.

- PeaceMeal, March/April 2005

2000 NPT RevCon rhetoric fails action test

For the sake of achieving consensus, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 2000 Review Conference adopted a statement that provides a smoke screen of rhetoric behind which the major nuclear powers can hide their refusal to get serious about nuclear disarmament.

After meeting for a month at the United Nations in New York, the 187 nations parties to the NPT went into overtime on May 20 and adopted a statement containing the much ballyhooed word "unequivocal." The Big Five nuclear powers — the United States, Russia, France, Britain, and China — agreed to an "unequivocal undertaking ... to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament." Until now, the Big Five have always insisted on qualifiers like the "ultimate" elimination of nuclear weapons.

U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan called the statement "a significant step forward in humanity's pursuit of a more peaceful world." Others said the Conference statement gives at least a psychological boost to languishing efforts to contain and abolish nuclear weapons.

But the psychology is wrong. Much better that the conflict between the Non-Nuclear Weapons States pushing for disarmament and the Nuclear Weapons States resisting those efforts be brought into focus, because the media have painted the statement as an "everything-is-beautiful" pledge to disarm.

Nothing could be further from the truth. The hypocritical statement does not represent a change in substance but only in semantics. The Big Five rejected any timetable for meeting the goal of nuclear disarmament as well as a proposed requirement that they document their steps toward disarmament during the next five years. They also rejected concerns that thousands of the world's 35,000 nuclear weapons remain on hair-trigger alert and refused a pledge of no-first-use of nuclear weapons in battle.

An anonymous official of the Clinton administration confirmed that the Conference statement did not indicate a change in U.S. policy. Official U.S. policy is to maintain an arsenal of some 10,000 nuclear warheads into the middle of the century. The U.S. is preparing to resume production of tritium.for that very purpose.

China's U.N. Ambassador was among those critical, saying the statement did not "fully reflect the current international situation, nor does it call for the removal of fundamental obstacles to nuclear disarmament." He cited a host of issues that weren't addressed, such as the expansion of NATO and its policy for use of nuclear weapons and U.S. plans for a ballistic-missile defense system.

The nuclear powers did let some crumbs fall from the table, but nothing that would threaten their status quo. They agreed to a moratorium on nuclear weapon testing pending entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, further reductions of tactical nuclear weapons, and increased reporting of information about nuclear arsenals. They also agreed not to recycle plutonium and uranium removed from nuclear warheads, and to negotiate within the next five years a treaty banning the production of fissile material — but not tritium.

The 1970 NPT is the cornerstone of both non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament. As interpreted by the World Court, the Treaty legally binds the Nuclear Weapons States to achieve nuclear disarmament. In return, the Non-Nuclear Weapons States agree to forego nuclear weapons. However, in the intervening three decades and in spite of the Treaty obligation to disarm, the United States and Russia have massively increased their nuclear arsenals.

Taking note of the 1996 World Court judgment that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is illegal under international law, the Conference reaffirmed as a bottom line for all peoples of the world that "the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons."

Supporters of non-proliferation and nuclear weapons abolition need to maintain a concerted effort to prod the Nuclear Weapons States along.

- Jim Stoffels, chairman and editor
PeaceMeal, May/June 2000

U.S. tritium plans violate NPT obligations

The United States government is pursuing a new tritium supply program in order to maintain a large nuclear arsenal for the indefinite future. Tritium, a key ingredient of most nuclear weapons, needs to be replenished periodically because it decays at a rate of 5.5% per year. Plans of the Administration and Congress to build multi-billion-dollar tritium production facilities are in blatant violation of United States nuclear treaty obligations to achieve nuclear disarmament.

The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), signed by the United States 29 years ago, contains a commitment to work toward nuclear disarmament. The opinion rendered last year by the International Court of Justice on the illegality of nuclear weapons asserts that the NPT requires the nuclear powers to actually achieve nuclear disarmament, not merely conduct ongoing negotiations.

When the NPT was extended indefinitely at the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995, the nuclear powers had to make three commitments:

1. Complete a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) for the 1996 fall session of the United Nations General Assembly.

2. Bring to an "early conclusion" a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

3. Engage in the "determined pursuit" of "systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons."

The first commitment was met, although it is questionable whether the CTBT will become law because of India's refusal to sign unless the nuclear powers commit to nuclear disarmament.

The second commitment leaves a giant loophole. A ban on the production of fissile material is irrelevant to the United States and Russia. Both countries have so much weapons grade plutonium that the problem they face is disposal. The same is not the case for tritium, a fusion material used to boost the explosive power of nuclear weapons. Tritium would not be covered by a production ban limited to fissile material.

The third commitment above is blatantly violated by the U.S. policy decision to renew tritium production. The current U.S. supply of tritium (about 75 kilograms) would supply 1,000 nuclear warheads until 2040 and a smaller stockpile until the end of the 21st century. There is no reason why the United States and other nuclear weapon States should not have reduced their stockpiles well below current treaty limits by the year 2020 and eliminated nuclear weapons entirely by the middle of the 21st century. The policy decision to produce more tritium signals U.S. intent to flout its obligation to negotiate to achieve nuclear disarmament.

To carry out that policy, the Department of Energy (DOE) has issued a Record of Decision to begin work on the two most promising tritium supply alternatives:

1. Initiate purchase of an existing commercial reactor (operating or partially complete) or of irradiation services with an option to purchase the reactor for conversion to a defense facility; and

2. Design, build, and test critical components of a proton accelerator system for tritium production.

A decision on which alternative to implement fully is to be made by the end of 1997.

Even though defense production in civilian reactors is illegal, DOE is planning a demonstration test of tritium production in a commercial nuclear reactor this year (September 1997). DOE argues that the test, to be carried out in TVA's Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, would not violate the NPT because the amount to be produced would be small and it wouldn't be used in weapons.

The test does violate the third commitment above, however, as it demonstrates a definite intent to maintain a large nuclear arsenal rather than a "determined pursuit" of nuclear disarmament. In fact, DOE has declared its intent to operate tritium supply facilities "well into the middle of the next century."

Although significant reductions of the nuclear arsenals of the United States and former Soviet Union are resulting from the START I and START II treaties, neither treaty dictates a limit on stockpile size. The treaties limit only the numbers of warheads that can actually be loaded on strategic delivery systems. The START I Treaty limit is 6,000 warheads and the START II protocol limit is 3,500 warheads.

Current U.S. national security policy is to keep the option to reconstitute the stockpile to START I levels, that is, to keep at least 6,000 warheads loaded or stored. This policy is the driving force behind the alleged need to have a new tritium production facility operational by the year 2011.

There is a no-cost alternative to this tritium supply program, one which would strengthen rather than violate the NPT: a negotiated ban on tritium production. A proposal for a mutual, verifiable tritium production ban was put forth in 1988 — the same year the last tritium production reactor at the Savannah River Site was shut down. The proposal was made by a group of eminent U.S. scientists, including two former heads of the Theoretical Division at Los Alamos National Laboratory (that is, two former heads of nuclear weapons design) and two Nobel laureates, in collaboration with the Nuclear Control Institute in Washington DC.

Objections to the original proposal to ban tritium production are now largely irrelevant. Since 1988, the Cold War has ended; the former Soviet Union has disintegrated; and the START I, START II, and Comprehensive Test Ban treaties have been negotiated. The United States is helping Russia dismantle its nuclear weapons.

These dramatic political successes have built a solid foundation of confidence on which to base further disarmament treaties. A treaty to ban production of tritium is a next natural addition to this string of successes. The only requirement is that the U.S. forego its present commitment to nuclear weapons as a security blanket and adopt a true commitment to nuclear disarmament.

That change in attitude — to seeing nuclear weapons as a threat to national security rather than a protection — is becoming more prevalent among military leaders. General George Lee Butler, commander-in-chief of U.S. nuclear forces until 1994, and 60 other generals and admirals from 17 countries including the other nuclear powers, have called for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Following the World Court opinion last year, however, a proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons by the year 2020, made by the Group of 21 Non-Aligned Nations to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, was not even accepted for discussion by the United States and other nuclear powers.

Proposals for action:

All nuclear weapon States undertake a moratorium on tritium production.
Include a ban on tritium production in the proposed fissile material cut-off treaty.
Nuclear weapon States fulfill their obligation to conclude negotiations on comprehensive nuclear disarmament.

Move nuclear disarmament forward, not backward!

NO to new tritium production facilities.

YES to a ban on tritium production.

PeaceMeal, March/April 1997