Miscellaneous

The Government undertakes to supply the quantities of uranium metal necessary for the construction and operation of the Plant, in the state of purity requisite for carrying out the transmutation process in the Plant as designed and constructed. The fabrication of the uranium into such forms as may be required for its use in the Plant, and the testing of the uranium before and after fabrication, and the testing of other materials for the Plant such as graphite and aluminum, will be a part of the work under the Contract. For metal testing, graphite and aluminum testing, and other purposes, the Plant will include a test pile of a type similar to the so-called "Argonne Forest" pile being used for research purposes by the University of Chicago. On account of the under-developed state of the recovery and purification processes, and the possibility that those processes may require extensive modification in the course of initial and continuing attempts to operate them satisfactorily, rather large technical laboratory facilities will be provided at the Plant.

The conduct and control of the transmutation and recovery processes, and the determination of radiation levels in and around all operating equipment and throughout the Plant site and adjoining areas for protection of operating personnel and inhabitants of the neighborhood of the Plant, demand large numbers of electronic and other instruments of diverse types and sensitivities. Many of these instruments have had to be developed in the course of the research leading to the present state of the transmutation and recovery processes. Development has not been carried to the point of readiness for commercial production in several critical areas. The procurement of the necessary instruments, the training of personnel in their use, and their maintenance in use, may delay and hamper completion and operation of the Plant. On account of the serious instrument problem which is faced in design, construction and operation of the Plant, the Plant will include rather large instrument shops and laboratories.

Numerous changes have been made in the proposed scope of the work, both in the type and size of units and apparatus and in the number of units which will be constructed. Other changes will be made as additional information is obtained and design and construction proceed. Initially, piles operating at high temperature and cooled by helium gas under pressure instead of water, were considered. Serious difficulties encountered in design, and foreseeable grave problems of procurement, construction and operation, combined to indicate that the helium-cooled pile is undesirable and relatively inoperative as compared with the water-cooled pile. Accordingly, it is planned to construct water-cooled piles.

So-called "heavy water" (pure deuterium oxide) might be employed instead of pure graphite for slowing the neutrons in the piles. On the basis of present very incomplete information "heavy water" appears to have physics advantages over graphite and may have engineering advantages. However, "heavy water" is not available in more than small quantities, and will become available only slowly and in amounts too small to serve for the earliest production of the desired quantities of Plutonium. Moreover, as beforesaid, information necessary for successful use of "heavy water" is very incomplete. Therefore, inasmuch as time and military considerations must govern, it has been agreed that graphite should be used in the Plant.

The estimated cost of the work under the Contract has been calculated by the Contractor before completing designs or even concluding its study of the processes to be used in the Plant. Therefore, the Contractor offers the cost figures in the Contract as rough estimates only; intended to be, but not sure to have been, conservatively calculated. It is the Contractor’s understanding that speed and assurance of production coupled with safety in operation, are the paramount objectives in the work; and that cost is secondary, though never to be left out of consideration.

It is not possible to estimate the capacity of the Plant except with accuracy so small that estimates based upon it are altogether tentative. The ability to remove heat and at the same time maintain the temperature below the range where excessive corrosion may occur, is the limiting known consideration in the capacity of a pile. The amount of heat evolved per unit of Plutonium formed, estimated to be 1000 kilowatt-days per gram, is known only with an estimated accuracy of plus or minus 20%. Ability to remove heat as planned can be proved only by actual operation of a pile. Similarly, the time required for charging and discharging the piles, and the speed and efficiency of the recovery process, can be determined only by experience. The construction of four 250,000-kilowatt piles was planned initially, together with recovery equipment to handle the output of four such piles. The roughly estimated capacity of the Plant was then 600 grams (1.3 pounds) of Plutonium per day on the basis of 75% efficiency in pile operation and 80% recovery yield. However, the contemplated military use is stated by the Government to require increments of about fifteen to eighteen kilograms (33-40 pounds) of Plutonium, and the rate of accumulation of these increments is the controlling factor in required capacity. Accordingly, a very tentative forecast production schedule has been prepared by the Contractor, comparing the dates on which various numbers of such increments could be produced by the use of one, two, three or four piles. On the basis of this schedule the Contracting Officer has directed the construction of three piles, together with recovery equipment of corresponding capacity. It would be necessary to operate three 250,000-kilowatt piles at say 90% efficiency and to secure say 90% yield in the recovery equipment now to be provided, in order to produce 600 grams of Plutonium per day. Attainment of such efficiency and yield is improbable short of years of operating experience. At 75% efficiency in pile operation and 80% recovery yield, the estimated capacity of the Plant is now 450 grams of Plutonium per day. However, as beforesaid and for the reasons stated, no estimate of the capacity of the Plant can be other than tentative. The Plant to be constructed under the Contract is therefore to be considered to be a three-250,000-kilowatt-graphite-pile Plant, and not a Plant whose size and specifications are determined by its estimated output.

The Contractor has made plain to the Government its inexperience in radioactivity and in physics as compared with chemistry; particularly its inexperience in nuclear physics, with which no industrial organization in the United States has worked, so far as the Government and the Contractor are aware. The Contractor has stated to the Government its extreme reluctance, because of this inexperience, to undertake the work under the Contract. Nevertheless, the Government has insistently requested the Contractor to undertake the work. The Government has emphasized to the Contractor the extreme importance and urgency of the work, stating that in the opinion of the highest Government authorities the military advantage to the nation possessing a supply of Plutonium is so great that it should be possible to force a victorious end to hostilities merely by military use of a sufficient amount of Plutonium; that available evidence very strongly suggests that the enemies of the United States in the present war are working to produce a quantity of Plutonium or its equivalent; and that there is no defense against military use of Plutonium or its equivalent by these enemies except counteruse. In consequence, the Contractor has agreed to undertake the work, with the distinct understanding that there is no assurance that the Contractor will be able successfully to design, construct and operate the Plant to be provided under the Contract, particularly within the time period covered in the Contract. The necessity and justification for such understanding are evident from the statements of fact and circumstance in this Memorandum.

It is obvious that the construction and operation of the Plant to be provided under the Contract will involve extraordinary hazards to life and property. Some of these hazards are unmeasurable, by virtue of the newness of the technical field and the incompleteness of the information available. Hazards not now foreseen at all, may be met. Under these circumstances, the resources of the Contractor, when undertaking the work for national war effort reasons only, cannot justly be placed in jeopardy. The Contractor will conduct the work as safely as its judgement based on experience and on advice given it at the instance of the Government, will permit; but the Contractor cannot and does not accept responsibility for the results of its exercise of judgment, or for the acts or omissions of its employees directly involved in the work, as they may affect the outcome of the work or the lives and property of its employees or others. Pursuant to the terms of the Contract, the Government has accepted this responsibility and will hold the Contractor harmless accordingly.

The Contractor has no knowledge and expresses no opinion regarding the ability of Plutonium to perform the military functions which it is calculated to have; and regarding the practicability of handling quantities of Plutonium with safety; and regarding the composition and form into which Plutonium must be put to perform its military functions; and regarding the individual and total amounts of Plutonium required to perform these functions. The work to be done by the Contractor under the Contract will include only the delivery to the Government, on the Plant site, of such quantities of Plutonium as may be produced during the period of the Contract, in such composition and form as are required by the specifications subsequently agreed to. The Government assumes full responsibility for the Plutonium when so delivered.

The Contractor has had no part in the research which has resulted in the discovery and development to their present state of the transmutation process for production of Plutonium and the chemical process for recovery of Plutonium from the crude product of the transmutation process. The research has been conducted by the University of Chicago and others, largely under the auspices of the Government. Continued research, including the operation of the semi-works plant and studies of the health hazards involved in the transmutation and recovery processes, which will be conducted during the period of design, construction and operation of the Plant to be provided under the Contract, will be done by the University of Chicago and others under Government sponsorship. The results of the research to date, and of the continuing research carried out by the University, are being supplied to the Contractor at the instance of the Government. From time to time, the Contractor will request additional information from the University. At the instance of the Government, the University will attempt to develop this information by studies and experiments. The Contractor will confine its efforts to the interpretation and application of the research results, except as developmental and other technical work may be required at the Plant in an attempt to overcome difficulties which may arise in the course of operation. The University has concurred in all major technical decisions made and acted upon by the Contractor prior to or coincident with approval by the Government; and the University, at the instance of the Government, will review all such technical decisions yet to be made as well as the essential technical details of planned operation procedures, and concur before the Contractor acts upon the decisions or begins use of the procedures.

The research performed by the University includes development of the transmutation process and chemical recovery procedures, and investigation of the nature of the health hazards involved. No obstacle has as yet appeared in those investigations that proves the impracticability of carrying through the production of Plutonium successfully and safely. The large-scale Plant is, however, expected to produce Plutonium a hundred thousand times faster than is being done in the laboratory. Considering the many new problems that may arise from this and other sources, the University can in no way guarantee to the Government or the Contractor the success of the process under Plant conditions of operation, or the absence of damage to personnel and property.

Although the Contractor is experienced only in industrial operations based on chemistry, and has never dealt with industrial operations based on nuclear physics, or with any process involving radioactivity in any degree or form it is the Contractor’s judgment, limited by its inexperience in the fields involved, that the transmutation process for production of Plutonium and the chemical process for recovery of Plutonium ultimately can be put into successful operation. The discovery of these processes and their development to their present state in so short a time and in the face of many handicaps, are extraordinary accomplishments. From its experience with the development of chemical processes from the laboratory scale to the commercial plant, the Contractor would expect that successful large-scale operation of the transmutation and recovery processes would require approach by way of more and longer-continued successive steps on the laboratory, the semi-works, the pilot-plant, and the initial-unit scales, than are included in the present enterprise as now planned. However, as stated, in the opinion of the highest Government authorities the critical importance of time in obtaining quantities of Plutonium justifies the present program; and the Contractor believes that barring factors now unforeseen or the too-adverse effect of factors mentioned in this Memorandum, it will be able to produce Plutonium with the cooperation of the University of Chicago and the Corps of Engineers.